The paper examines the impact of corruption on the share of government expenditure, related to the provision of public goods in health, education, and military sectors. The paper introduces a theoretical model that applies "the Samuelson rule of public good provision" to illuminate how corruption increases the cost of providing public goods and hypothetically leads to the underprovision of public goods in some specific sectors. The paper then provides an empirical investigation on how an increase in corruption can influentially mislead the share of government expenditure, focusing on 39 emerging market countries during the period of 1999 -2010. The results suggest that corruption stimulates the expenditure share on military while lowering the share of spending in health and education. These results are significant and robust across a variety of specifications, and are consistent with the findings of previous studies.
Introduction
In the country where government and public agents behave unethically or illegally engage into corruption activities, the optimal allocation of public resources in generating the best social welfare is likely to be distorted and misinformed. In fact, the distortion of optimal allocation typically occurs when the corrupt government makes an excessive investment in a non-productive sector, where the large bribes can be easily exacted, rather than productive sector (Mauro, 1995) . This type of corruption is considered as the most dangerous form of corruption, because it could potentially lead to a number of long-term undesirable consequences in the society such as ineffective government spending, limitation of investment and economic growth, prevention of public accessibility, aggravated social welfare, inequality, and poverty.
In the lieu of economics, the essential problem of the corruption is primarily its potential in increasing the cost of providing public services. Eigen and Eigen-Zhucci (2003) argued government corruption essentially increased the price of expenditure and reduced the quality and quantity of the public services provided by the government. For instance, if a company bribes government officials to secure its contract to supply public services, the company would have to pass the cost of bribes to its consumers by charging a higher unit price. Subsequently, the inelastic consumers, who are incompetent in purchasing an alternative service, will have to bear this burden cost by being charged for this artificial high price. As the poor are generally considered as inelastic consumers of the public services, the higher price caused by corruption directly affects them by lowering available quantity and limiting their accessibility to the public services, which ultimately leave the society with the inequality issue. Delavallade (2006) argued "the choices of government allocation highly depend on government"s decision, and those choices can vary according to the level of public corruption in the country." The evidence collected from previous studies has collectively approved this claim. For instance, the corruption was strongly correlated with the reduction of operation and maintenance expenditures (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) , the deterioration in education and health expenditures (Mauro, 1998) , and the increase in military spending (Gupta, de Mello & Sharan, 2001) .
i Moreover, it is evident that the highest bribe project can be easily found in the market where the degree of competition is relatively low such as monopolistic or oligopolistic. This is because the products supplied by the firms in this market are difficult to be measured their actual values quantitatively as they are usually related to innovative and technological advancements, in which the corruption footprints are hard to be detected and can easily evaporate (Mauro, 1998; Delavallade, 2006; Hessamis, 2010) . To compensate for the over spending on the higher bribe sectors, the government with a certain budget constraint will have to lower the spending on the other sectors where the bribes are rarely available (e.g., social protection, recreation, education, health, culture, religion, and safety).
Building on the evidence collected from previous studies, the paper aims to contribute a comprehensive analysis of the subsequent impact of corruption on the government ability in providing the public goods, focusing on the emerging market economies. First, the paper presents an analytical framework in theorizing and predicting the effects of corruption occurred via a misled expenditure allocation. Second, the paper provides an empirical analysis, which accounts for the weakness and flaws in previous studies, to quantitatively measure how much the allocation of public expenditures on education, health, and military has been distorted by the corruption, using the dataset spanning over the period 1999 -2010. To our knowledge, a majority of studies on how corruption relates to public expenditures tend to focus on two extreme sides of the observation either well-developed or developing countries, and there is no study that exclusively and explicitly explores this evidence in emerging market economies. Since emerging market countries seems to share a similarity in their economic characteristics, narrowing down the observations into this group of countries provides us a potential opportunity to overcome the problem of heterogeneity across the countries, which has normally been disregarded in the previous studies.
ii In addition, a possible weakness of empirical models in those previous studies is the ignorance of government decentralization. If the corruption and a degree of decentralization are strongly correlated, omitting this variable in the model might cause unexpected bias results. To improve the empirical models of previous studies, we control the influence of government decentralization in order to identify a pure relationship between corruption and public expenditure.
To accomplish the objectives, the paper has been organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical model illustrating the how the efficient provision of public goods can be directly affected by government corruption in misallocating public resources. Section 3 develops an econometric modelling to empirically quantify the theoretical prediction and Section 4 summarizes all of empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main lessons and provides an avenue for future research.
Theoretical Analysis: An Impact of Corruption on Public Goods
In this section, we present the theoretical analysis of how corruption affects the provision of public goods in the lieu of government misallocation of the public resources, an increase in the spending on the items of which provide them the highest bribes and a decrease in the spending on the items of which the bribes are rarely available. Followed Eigen& Eigen-Zhucci (2003) , the corruption occurred by government misallocation potentially increased the marginal cost of providing the public goods, resulting in less availability of public goods. According to this fundamental argument, we present a theoretical analysis by applying the Samuelson Rule to illustrate how the additional cost of corruption plays a significant role in terminating the efficient provision of public goods.
Suppose an immoral government engages corruption activities by receiving bribes from the firm and raising government expenditure of which sector where the firm is physically located in. To compensate for the overspending on this sector, the government with a given fiscal year budget has to lower its expenditure on the other sectors. In this case, we assume that the firm in military sector bribes government for raising the level of spending, while education is a sector targeted by government to reduce the spending. Given this scenario, the Pareto-optimal framework can be applied to analyze the impact of corruption in one sector on the quantity of public goods in another sector.
To simplify the optimization problem, we assume that in economy there are only 2 goods, X and Y, where X is private good with the price , Y is public good with price . Given this scenario, the public good can be thought of the education, and suppose that there is a corruption going on in the military sector. When the government begins to move away the public resources from one sector to another by increasing the expenditure related the military and reducing the expenditure related education, the education sector is no longer receive the same amount of government subsidy as it usually does, which ultimately causes the unit price of the education to increase. The extent to which the price of education will increase is strongly dependent upon the intensity of corruption in the military sector.
iii For that reason, the unit price of education is no longer held at , but it also bears the additional burden of the corruption cost in the military sector. Consequently, the unit price of education is now , augmented by corruption cost Therefore, the economy resource constraint can be presented as Equation 5) indicates that the level of public good (education) will be underprovided if the scale of corruption cost is increased as the government expenditure is moved away from the education sector to the military sector.
vii As mentioned earlier, corruption government is likely to favor investment projects which generate the highest bribes in return, and corruption government then has to cut the spending on the other projects in order to compensate for over spending on the highest bribes one. As a result, the optimal provision of public goods will ultimately be distorted, and the level of public goods will be underprovided in some sectors where bribes are rarely available and be overprovided in the highest bribe sector.
Empirical Analysis: Impact of Corruption on Government Expenditure
To relate our theoretical analysis to the empirical model, we use the share of government expenditure on each item as a proxy in quantifying the government provision of public goods. viii Therefore, a higher share of expenditure implies a higher provision of public goods, vice versa. In empirical analysis section, we would like to discuss briefly about the evidence found in those related studies, data descriptive statistic, methodology, and model specification. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) were the first study that examined the effect of corruption on the government expenditure. The panel regression was used to analyze the relationship between these two variables. In the study, public investment, quality of infrastructure, government revenue and government expenditure were treated as dependent variable and the key explanatory variable was corruption index derived from two major sources, Business International (BI) and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). They found that the higher level of corruption is associated with 1) the higher level of investment, 2) the lower government revenue, 3) the lower government expenditure on operations and maintenance, and 4) the lower quality of public infrastructure. Mauro (1998) extended the Tanzi and Davoodi study by examining the effects of corruption on each item of government expenditure. He conducted the cross-sectional regression over 100 countries and found that corruption significantly reduced the expenditure on health and education. However, the weakness of his model specification, which has been widely criticized, was a laxity of the control variable used in the regression. His regression model contained only one key explanatory variable, corruption index derived from ICRG and one control variable, per capita GDP. In particular, omitting some potential factors in a set of control variable could cause a serious bias estimation. Moreover, simply calculating the average of corruption over time and employing it as dependent variable might not be well explaining for the heterogeneity across countries.
Related Empirical Review
A similar study conducted by Gupta et al. (2001) examined how corruption could alter the level public expenditure on national defense. In particular, they employed panel regression in quantifying the effect of corruption on military expenditure over 120 countries in the period of [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . By employing panel data, they found evidence that corruption strongly stimulated military spending, which was not found in Mauro (1998) . However, solely focusing on military spending might not be able to illustrate how corruption induces the flow of public expenditure from one sector to another. Delevallade (2006) made a great contribution in the field by distinguishing between "quantity effect" and "allocation effect" of corruption. In fact, he emphasized that employing the share of government expenditure on each item, calculated as percentage of total expenditure, as dependent variable in regression would allow us to capture the allocation effect of corruption. In contrast, using the total amount of government expenditure on each item would capture solely the quantity effect of corruption. In his study, three-stage least square method was used to examine the allocation effect of corruption on government expenditure in 64 developing countries for the period of 1996-2001. The result was that corruption reduced the portion of social expenditure (education, health, and social protection) in total spending but stimulated the part of budget dedicated to public services, energy, culture, housing, and defense. However, the weakness of the study is the imbalanced panel data set, which contained wide entities (64 counties) but short observed periods (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) .
Recent working paper by Hessami (2010) extended the scope of those previous studies by examining corruption effects on all shares of public expenditure, including social protection, health, education, defense, general public services, public safety, community amenities, environmental protection, recreation, and culture, for 26 OCED countries during the period of 1996-2006. The study followed Delevallade (2006) footstep in capturing the allocation effect of corruption on public expenditure and found that corruption increased the share of expenditure on health and environmental protection, while the share of expenditure on social protection and recreation, culture and religion decreased with the higher level of corruption. These results seem to diverge from what had been found in the previous studies, because OCED contain mostly well-developed countries, where the nature of economy and the level corruption control are slightly different from developing countries observed by other studies. Additionally, the citizens in these countries are well-informed and highly educated as compared to those developing countries, so it makes corruption activities easy to be detected. Even though using OCED countries might be beneficial in overcoming heterogeneity across countries, the variation in corruption related to the government expenditure might rarely be exposed as the corruption is a rare event in OCED countries.
By reviewing these empirical studies, we have observed the differences in findings are derived from the following factors: i) Model specification: Some studies perform crosssectional regression analysis that might not be well explaining the heterogeneity across countries. Some conduct panel data analysis, incorporating both cross-sectional and time-series dimension. ii) Set of control variables: There are different sets of control variables in each literature, some of them do not account for potential factors such as per capita GDP, monetary factors (money supply, inflation and interest), government budget deficit, demography, government decentralization. Econometrically, omitting potential variables could seriously cause biased estimators. iii) Different countries observation: Different countries typically have different effect of corruption on public spending due to diversification of economic nature, law and regulation, demographic, government system (OCED, 2012).
Methodology
In this section, we aim to describe our empirical methodology involving dataset, descriptive statistic, and model specification to quantify the effect of corruption on the share of government expenditure. A sample used in this study is the group of 39 emerging countries during the period of 1999 -2010, containing 466 observations. The share of government expenditure on health, education, and military will be served as dependent variables, and these data are gathered from World Bank dataset. Followed Delevallade (2006) , the share of government expenditure is expressed as a percentage of total government expenditure to capture the allocation effect of corruption. To have a consistency in corruption measurement along with the previous studies, Corruption Index from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) serves as key explanatory variable in our analysis.
ix The index is an assessment of corruption within the political system, and it is ranked in a range between 0 -6, where 0 indicates the highest risk of corruption and 6 indicates the lowest risk of corruption. To avoid omitting variable bias, other variables that possibly influence the government expenditure have also included into a set of control variables:
 GDP per capita: Followed Mauro (1998), GDP per capita is included in a set of control variables. An increase in per capita GDP signals economic growth, which represents a structural change in government expenditure. GDP per capita is expressed in the in term of US dollars and gathered from UNESCO.  Age dependency ratio: A ratio measures the number of aging dependents (over the age of 65) to the working population (age 15 -64). Technically, a higher ratio indicates that those of working age are experiencing a financial burden in supporting the aging population. The data is gathered from World Bank.  Trade volume: A commitment to free trade significantly facilitates emerging economies to grow rapidly, and this fast-growing economy might encourage government to support a certain type of investment project for sustaining the growth. Nevertheless, government supporting in specific project might eventually alter the composition of government expenditure. Trade volume is expressed as a percentage of GDP (total amount of trade in US dollar divided by GDP in US dollar). The data is gathered from International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Inflation: The government spending ultimately causes inflation or hyperinflation.
Hence, decision of increasing government expenditure is typically bounded under the current or targeted inflation level. To capture a variation of inflation in government expenditure, the inflation, gathered from ICRG, is included into a set of control variables.  Government debt: The amount of debt owed by a central government potentially limits government"s ability to increase spending in some certain investment. In particular, debt level in previous year significantly limits the spending in current fiscal year. Hence, the lagged one period of government debt is also included in a set of control variable to capture this effect. Government debt is expressed as a percentage of GDP, and the data is derived from World Bank.  Government stability risk: The rating aims at assessing both government"s ability to carry out its declared program and its ability to stay in office. In fact, government"s stability plays a significant role in determining the level of expenditure. For instance, if the government expects to stay in office for longperiod, they typically have an incentive to finance some specific long-term public programs such as education or research development. A score of 12 points equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk. The data for government stability risk is obtained from ICRG  War risk: The rating between 0 -4 measures the risk of countries" external conflicts. During a terrorist attack or a national security threat, the share of government expenditure is typically distorted by shifting heavily toward an urgent investment, military expenditure.  Civil war risk: The rating between 0 -4 measures the risk of countries" internal conflicts. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil war and the highest is given for the countries with low risk of civil war. Our intention to embrace this variable is based upon the evidence found in the study of civil war effects on education by Lai and Thyne (2007) , which indicates that the government typically cut the expenditure on such long-term project in order to finance short-term project such as military expenditure and health services during civil war. The data for civil war risk is obtained from ICRG risk guide.
One possible weakness of the empirical literatures on corruption and government expenditure is the ignorance of government decentralization. According to Gupta et al. (2001) , "decentralization can also lead to corruption and elite capture due to loosened central control, lack of appropriate institutional capacity and inadequate checks and balances at local levels. It can also increase regional disparities between richer and poorer districts. Decentralization is a risky strategy that needs to be cautiously implemented." If corruption and decentralization are correlated, and if decentralization influence government expenditures, then omitting this variables might cause a serious bias. To circumvent this problem, we include the additional proxy in the set of control variables to capture the degree of decentralization in government expenditure.
 State: This variable is the rating number between 0 -2, indicating whether the state/province governments are locally elected. 0 = low level of local election, 1 = moderate level of local election, 2 = high level of local election. The data for this variable is retrieved from World Bank Database of Political Institutions (DPI).
Descriptive Statistics
The average corruption index of 39 emerging countries during the period of 1999 -2010 is approximately 2.4 points, indicating slightly high degree of corruption activities. The possibility of explaining this scenario is that the majority of emerging countries, known as developing countries, are characterized as being less restrictive laws and regulation, which might result in ineffectiveness on corruption enforcement. However, the descriptive statistics reveal that Slovakia, Columbia, Chile, and Hungary a group of countries where corruption activities rarely take place (above 3.8 points). On the other hand, Myanmar, South Africa, and Nigeria are the countries that exhibit a high degree of corruption (below 1.5 points). Other countries in the observation display a moderate degree of corruption, ranging from 2 to 3 points. 
Model Specification
Since our dataset is a panel data that contains the observed characteristics across countries over multiple time periods, the panel regression (pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects) is the most appropriate method to analyze how the corruption potentially affects the share of government expenditures (education, health, and military) in 39 emerging countries. xii Based on previous related empirical works, the share of government expenditures can be categorized as a function of corruption variable and other control variables. Thus, we can start with the following relationship ( ) Where is corruption index with one-year lagged. Since the corruption index collected from ICRG is based on survey and interview, which corruption event might happen before or after it is recorded, a one-year lag variable of corruption helps us to circumvent the problem of endogeneity.
denotes the set of control variables that influence a variation in the share of government expenditure. To evaluate the impact of corruption level on the share of public expenditures on education, health and military, we then transform equation 6) into three econometric forms. xiii The key explanatory variable in our analysis is corruption ( . The vector of control variables will have to vary across all 3 equations, because each item of government expenditures has different factors that influence the spending level. Since we also interest in finding whether or not the degree of government decentralization alters the effect of corruption on the share of government expenditure, the model is extended to include decentralization ( ) as a control variable. Followed Korneliussen (2009) , there is an interaction effects between corruption and decentralization where both variables depend upon each other. Thus, the extended model also includes the interaction term between corruption and decentralization, which can be constructed by simply multiplying and variables. The second set of regression model incorporating decentralization can be presented as:
Results
This section empirically performs the panel data regression in analyzing the relationship between corruption and the 3 major components of government expenditure in emerging economies. The estimated results of equation (6a) - (6c) indicates that corruption decreases the share of expenditure on health and education, but increases the share of expenditure on military. The results seem to be robust across OLS, fixed effects and random effects specifications.
Health Expenditure
It is evident that the impact of on the share of health expenditure is statically significant and positive across all specifications. A high score on the perceived corruption index (low level of corruption) is associated with the higher share of government expenditure on health. The estimated coefficient on is significant at the 5% level. The interpretation of coefficient is that, as corruption index increases by one point, the share of health expenditure will increase by 1.04 percent.
xiv Under corruption realm, the government is likely to take away some amount of health expenditure to finance other projects that they could get higher bribes. The obtained result is coherent with the finding in Mauro (1998) and Delavallade (2006) , which indicated the share of health expenditure was typically lower for countries with higher level of corruption. However, our result seems to be incompatible with the finding in Hessami (2009) , which discovered that higher corruption led to a higher expenditure on health in OCED countries. The difference in finding mainly arises from different group of observation. Our study mainly focuses on emerging economies, where the natures of corruption and economy are somewhat different from those OCED countries, so the government agents in these two groups might have different incentive to distort government expenditure in an exchange for bribes. The number in parenthesis underneath each estimate is the standard error (SE). The asterisks represent the level of significance at which the coefficient is judged to be statistically significant different from zero; *** indicates significance at a 1% level of significance; ** indicates significance at a 5% level of significance; * indicates significance at a 10% level of significance; and no stars indicates the coefficient is not significant at a 10% level of significance
Education Expenditure
From the regression results reported in table 4, it is evident that has a positive impact on the education spending, with the level of significance at 1% across all specifications. The results suggest the higher level of corruption is associated with lower spending on education. Particularly, the estimated coefficient indicates that the share of education expenditure will increase by 0.93 percent for every point increase in corruption index (low level of corruption).
xv A reduction on the share of education as level of corruption increases derives from the fact that, in the market of education, there is unlikely to appear monopoly firm that is willing to incentivize the government for a stimulus spending in the sector (Mauro, 1998) . In addition, in those developing countries, the improvement of education is not recognized as the first priority of the government, but in fact it seems to be a long-term strategic plan. Therefore, the education is the first target among public sectors to incur a spending cut once the government receives any illegal forms of bribes from the other sections.
Other control variables reveal to have expected sign of coefficient. However, the negative coefficient on GDP Per Capita provides an interesting interpretation; a higher GDP per capita will lower the share of government expenditure on education. Hessami (2009) asserted that education could be luxury goods when society reached a certain level of wealth. In other words, when people are richer, they are likely to afford for their own educational choices (e.g. private school, private university, or study abroad), so the government is no longer responsible to increase the expenditure share dedicated to education. The number in parenthesis underneath each estimate is the standard error (SE). The asterisks represent the level of significance at which the coefficient is judged to be statistically significant different from zero; *** indicates significance at a 1% level of significance; ** indicates significance at a 5% level of significance; * indicates significance at a 10% level of significance; and no stars indicates the coefficient is not significant at a 10% level of significance Table 5 demonstrates that higher corruption is associated with higher share of expenditure dedicated to military. The coefficient is significant at 5% level and negative for all specification. The estimated coefficient indicates that the share of military expenditure will decrease by -1.28 percent for every point increase of corruption index (low corruption).
Military Expenditure
xvi The obtained result is coherent with the evidence found in the study of corruption and military spending by Gupta et al. (2001) . The explanation of this finding is that the government is likely to shift public resources toward types of expenditure which corruption has low probability of detection, and these types of expenditure are typically related to technology-intensive products supplied by the firms in military sector.
xvii Other controls variables reveal to have expected sign in all three model specifications. GDP per capita has a positive impact on the share of military expenditure. Age dependency has a negative impact on military spending, indicating that the share of government expenditure on military will decline as aging population increase.
xviii War risk variable indicates that the countries with the higher risk of war or external conflicts will tend to raise the expenditure dedicated to national protection. The number in parenthesis underneath each estimate is the standard error (SE). The asterisks represent the level of significance at which the coefficient is judged to be statistically significant different from zero; *** indicates significance at a 1% level of significance; ** indicates significance at a 5% level of significance; * indicates significance at a 10% level of significance; and no stars indicates the coefficient is not significant at a 10% level of significance Table 6 summarizes all estimates obtained from the second set of equation (7a) -(7c).
In Corporation Degree of Government Decentralization
xix By controlling for degree of government decentralization, the results are still unchanged, higher corruption is associated with decreasing share of expenditure on health and education and increasing share of expenditure on military. The coefficients of are statically significant at 5% level in all specification. Thus, we conclude that the ignorance of including decentralization in capturing effects of corruption in previous studies did not cause biased estimator. The number in parenthesis underneath each estimate is the standard error (SE). The asterisks represent the level of significance at which the coefficient is judged to be statistically significant different from zero; *** indicates significance at a 1% level of significance; ** indicates significance at a 5% level of significance; * indicates significance at a 10% level of significance; and no stars indicates the coefficient is not significant at a 10% level of significance
Even though the impact of corruption on expenditure shares is unchanged (same sign on coefficients), the corruption differently manifests its marginal effect. Under controlling for government decentralization, the marginal effect of corruption can be derived by taking partial derivative of equation 7a)-7c) with respect to corruption variable:
In equation 8a), is the marginal effect of corruption when the country is classified as low level of local election (State = 0); is the marginal effect of corruption under moderate level of local election (State = 1); and is the marginal effect of corruption under high level of local election (State = 2). The results in table7 indicates that, as the countries is more decentralized, the marginal effect of corruption on decreasing share of health expenditure becomes larger (less spending on health as more decentralized). For education expenditure, the marginal effect of corruption is also larger than before (nearly double compared to results in Table 4 ) when including decentralization. There intuitive interpretation of this finding is that, at local administrative division of a country such as province, region or state, the corruption administrators might have a strong incentive to reduce spending on health and education to compensate an increase in spending on other activities that pay them back with higher bribery. The clarification of this interpretation has been described by Korneliusen (2009) , indicating that "corruption may take different forms in federal versus non-federal countries and that these different forms of corruption may work different way, or to different degree"
The impact of corruption on the share of military expenditure still has the same sign (negative) on coefficient, but its marginal effect is now smaller. The interpretation here is that military expenditure is normally controlled by central government rather than local government. Hence, under decentralization, the central government might have a smaller budget to spend on military so that technology-intensive firms might not have an incentive to bribe government to mislead this type of expenditures. The support of this interpretation can be found in research study conducted by Bodman, Ford, Gole and Hodge (2009), which indicated that higher levels of military expenditure are generally found in less decentralized countries.
To decide which specification is the best estimator among OLS, fixed effects, and random effects, we firstly conduct Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) principle in testing for random effects in the two set of regression, 6a) -6c) and 7a) -7c). The results suggest a presence of random effects within all equations at p-value < 0.05. Hence, at the first stage, the accuracy of random effects model strictly dominates OLS and fixed and effects. Then, at the second stage, we perform Hausman and receive p-value > 0.05, implying that the null hypothesis that both fixed effect and random effects estimators yield the same true parameter value cannot be rejected. However, random effects in general is estimated based upon Generalized Least Square (GLS) that has a smaller variance than Least Square (LS) used in fixed effects (Hill, Griffiths, & Lims, 2007) . Consequently, we conclusively perceive the random effect(s) as the best estimator among all models.
Summary and Conclusions
The paper theoretically and empirically examines the impact of corruption on the share of government expenditure. Applying the Samuelson rule of the public provision, our theoretical model explicitly demonstrates that corruption due to a misallocation of the public resources literally distorts the efficient provision of the public goods, particularly lowering the quantity of public goods in some specific sector where the bribes are rarely available. This is because the government itself theoretically faces with the budget constraint which does not allow for the spending beyond certain level, and thus to increase the spending on one specific sector unlawfully the government will have to lower the spending on another sector as an exchange. From the empirical analysis, the results show that the corruption activities among emerging market countries are likely to happen in the military sector as an increase in the military spending is positively correlated with an increase in the corruption index. A possible explanation for these findings is the degree of market competition is relatively low in the military sector, which encourages the monopoly firm to secure its long-term contract by paying bribes, and the products supplied in this market are quite related to the technological advancement (e.g., aircraft, weapons, radiophone), which facilitates the corruption footprint to be evaporated rapidly.
Nevertheless, the subsequent impact of the corruption in the military spending is a substantial reduction in the spending on the education and health sectors. As the education and health care are considered as a fundamental necessary for the citizens, the reduction on the spending due to the corruption might produce some negative effects in the long-run country"s economic development, and thus we strongly encourage government as well as policy makers to pay a strong attention on promoting laws and regulation in detecting corruption activities.
A limitation of our study is the fact that the dataset of public expenditures regarding the other areas such as housing, social protection and security, fuel and energy, and cultures is rarely available for these 39 emerging market countries. By having all of these variables, the paper would be able to provide a display of the dynamic effect of corruption on the public expenditure. For the future research, if the dataset is possible, we strongly encourage a complete analysis for the impact of corruption on these other sectors. Furthermore, what we learn from our empirical analysis is that corruption tends to decrease the spending on health and education, so we also encourage the future research to analyze the long-term consequence of the corruption related to the dynamics of human capital accumulation.
Endnotes
i If the level of government corruption in military sector is relatively high, the government would drastically increase the share of expenditure on military and decrease the share of expenditure on education, which in turn makes the unit price of education more costly.
ii Emerging market countries tend to share a similarity in term of economic characteristics, so that it is unlikely for the problem of heterogeneity iii If the level of government corruption in military sector is relatively high, the government would drastically increase the share of expenditure on military and decrease the share of expenditure on education, which in turn makes the unit price of education more costly. iv Note that we do not specify social welfare function, because we cannot be sure whether the aim of corruption government is to maximize the society well-being. v Refer to Appendix B: Mathematical note. vi Note, under standard assumption, increased consumption of goods will increase utility if good is normal. Thus, the sign of coefficients and is strictly positive. vii Comparative Static: By taking total differential in equation 4), we have . Then, we hold other exogenous variables constant except price augmented by corruption , we have viii Since it is difficult to measure the actual quantity of public goods, the share of government expenditure can be a good proxy to quantify the public goods provided by government.
ix According to previous studies (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Mauro, 1998; Delavallade, 2006; Hessami, 2010) , corruption Index from ICRG is the most reliable and universal used. x Appendix A: List of countries with the average score of corruption index during 1990-2010. xi A summary of sources are provided in Appendix C. xii Since emerging economy contains countries from different continents, OLS, fixed effects and random effects regression is used to check for robustness. xiii Previous studies (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Mauro, 1998; Gupta al et, 2001; Delavallade, 2006; Hessami, 2010) indicated that the relationship between government expenditure and corruption is linear, ( | ) and . xiv Explanation is based upon result obtain from random effects. xv Explanation is based upon result obtain from random effects. xvi Explanation is based upon result obtain from random effects. xvii The support of this finding can be found in Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977 by Hines (1995) , which indicated that international trade in military aircraft is particularly prone to corruption xviii An increase in age dependency ratio implies less number of working population and reduction in tax collection to finance government projects. xix Table 6 reports fixed effects and random effects as these two specifications is better than OLS in controlling for heterogeneity in decentralized systems across countries. xx Marginal effect of corruption on share of education and military expenditure is equal to , respectively, since coefficients on corruption and state interaction is not statically significant. 
